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Approximate numerical estimates are developed in order to quantify a variety of aspects of the
arms race. The results ofthese calculations are consistent with either direct observations or with
more sophisticated calculations. This paper will cover some of the following aspects of the arms
race: (1) the electromagnetic pulse (EMP); (2) spy satellites; (3) ICBM accuracy; (4) NAVSTAR
global positioning satellites; (5) particle and laser beam weapons; (6) the neutron bomb: and (7) war
games.

INTRODUCTION
The initial paper in this series) dealt with a number of
aspects of the arms race such as the Spartan (high altitude)
and Sprint (low altitude) and antiballistic missile (ABM)
systems; the tradeoff between accuracy and yield, and its
impact on superhardening missile sites and on multiple in
dependently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV); cost-ex
change ratios; and other issues. Almost a decade has passed
and the arms race continues. Because of advances in tech
nology, the arms race has become more of a qualitative
(new technologies) rather than a quantitative (numbers of
launchers) arms race. The newer technologies of cruise
missiles and the mobile MX missiles have exacerbated the
issue of "adequate" verification that is one of the touch
stones of arms control.agreements. Further technological
advances in the areas ofincreased missile accuracy through
the use of NAVSTAR satellites, laser and particle beam
weapons, the neutron bomb, and other technologies could
create additional layers of political and technological un
certainty.
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the broader
issues of war and peace such as action-reaction arms esca
lation, institutional pressures to increase armaments, a de
sire to have the same armaments as ones opponent (mirror
imaging), the historical factors which determine each na
tion's insecurities about its national security, a description
of the various arms control treaties, the difference between
sufficiency and parity, the connection between horizontal,
and vertical proliferation, and the tradeoffs between offen
sive-defensive, first-strike-second-strike, tactical-strate
gic weapons, and other factors. These issues have been
widely discussed by numerous authors 2 over the years; re
cently Schroeer and Dowling3 have compiled an extensive
reference list on these broader subjects as well as the techni
cal ones. The scope ofthis paper will not focus on these very
important (often subjective) issues, but, rather, it will deal
with some of the basic physics (objective and calculable)
factors involved in the development of some of the ad
vanced technologies.
Recently, W0llett 4 in an article entitled, "Physics and
Modern Warfare: The Awkward Silence," has pointed out
that
the typical general education course in physics or phys
ical science offers the student a misleading impression of
the interaction ofscience and society. Such courses tend
to stress the benefits to man which follow progress in
science (as well as the intellectual excitement and intrin
sic beauty of pure science). Little mention is made of the

serious problems man is presently faced with, problems
directly related to progress made in science.
This paper and its predecessor are an attempt to respond to
this challenge. Our goal is to encourage a dispassionate
methodology for analyzing the technical aspects of these
problems which emphasizes the basic science involved
without using overly sophisticated mathematics and phys
ics. Only by first considering these difficult technical prob
lems can we hope to make some progress towards develop
ing viable solutions. Our calculations on the physics of the
arms race will use only widely accepted numerical param
eters; our results agree with either direct observation or
with more complex calculations. In particular, this paper
will quantify the following technical aspects of the arms
race:
I. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The range (km), E field
strength (V1m), frequency spectrum (Hz), and radiative
mechanism.
II. Spy satellites. The size of objects and limits to resolu
tion.
III. ICBM accuracy. Uncertainties in parameters and
the hardness of missile sites.
IV. NAVSTAR global positioning satellites. Guidance
by delay times and by Doppler shifts.
V. Particle and laser beam weapons. Energy deposition,
beam current, angular resolution, burning a hole in the
atmosphere, and diffraction broadening.
VI. Neutron bomb. The enhanced neutron yield and re
duced blast area.
VII. War games. The lethality parameter K, Minuteman
vulnerability, and the Richardson model.
I. ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)
The command, control, the communication (e 3) systems
which control the U.S. strategic forces can be vulnerable to
the large electromagnetic pulses5 (E~25 000 V1m) that are
created by high-altitude (100--500 km) or low-altitude (0-2
km) bursts of nuclear weapons. This vulnerability has been
perceived by both the doves and hawks on arms control
matters as creating a possible instability in the arms race. If
a country perceives that the use of its strategic forces could
be negated by the EMP so that it could not command and
control its missiles, then this country might be tempted to
adopt a "launch on warning" policy so that it would use its
weapons rather than lose them to a preemptive first strike.
The situation is not as unstable as I have characterized it
because both nations have hardened their systems to par
tially withstand the EMP and both nations have viable,

second-strike missiles based on submarines that are not
vulnerable to a first strike. However, the perception ofvul
nerability in the land-based leg of the strategic triad (land
sea-air) can create pressures for a "now or never," launch
on-warning response. Since some of the C 3 facilities, such
as the Air Force's Looking Glass command post in the sky,
are more vulnerable than some of the strategic forces that
they are intended to direct, and since the U.S. land-based
missiles could be vulnerable to an EMP attack, it is clear
that the EMP can affect military policy.
A brief discussion of the mechanism that creates the
EMP is given below: In an explosion of a nuclear weapon,
many of the fission fragments are created in an excited
state. Since these excited states have energies of 1 MeV or
more, their lifetimes are much less than the risetime of the
explosion (about 10 ns); the de-excitation gamma rays are
emitted promptly. These prompt gamma rays interact with
air molecules and create forward scattered Compton elec
trons which constitute an energetic (about 1 MeV), nega
tive current flowing radially outward from the weapon (see
Fig. 1). In order to have a large EMP, it is necessary to
remove the spherical symmetry around the nuclear weap
on. At low altitudes above the Earth, a net dipole moment
is created because the Compton electrons are in the form of
a hemisphere rising above the Earth; the asymmetry of the
rising, charged hemisphere creates the EMP. At high alti
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A. Range of EMP
Assume that sufficient megatonnage is available for the
EMP pulse, and that one must only consider line-of-sight
geometry when considering covering the US with the EMP
pulse. What is the height H of the blast that is necessary to
cover 50% and 100% of the U.S.?
Answer: The extremum distance from the nuclear deton
ation to the ground is obtained from a right triangle which
has one side as the distance D, the other side the radius R of
the Earth at the location in question, and the hypotenuse
extends from the center of the Earth to the blast (H + R )
(see Fig. 1). It follows that
R 2 + D 2 = (H + R )2~R 2 + 2HR,
when H<.R. From this we obtain the height of the EMP
blast to cover all the U.S.:
H = D 2 /2R = (2500 km 2)212(64oo km) = 500 km.

H>40km

A

tudes, the symmetry is broken because the air density var
ies exponentially with height above the Earth so that the
Compton electrons are created asymmetrically and a net
dipole moment is created. The electrons created from the
very high altitude bursts (above the atmosphere) follow a
helical path about the Earth's magnetic field lines in the
very thin upper atmosphere; the centripetal acceleration of
these Compton electrons creates the EMP. In addition, the
x rays following a nuclear explosion can also produce EMP
effects by ionizing the atmosphere and momentarily affect
ing the magnetic field configuration of the Earth.

Forthecaseof50% ofthe U.S., D
km.

~
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Fig. I. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP). During a nuclear explosion gamma
rays are emitted promptly from the excited states of the fission fragments;
these prompt gamma rays transfer their energy to electrons in air mole
cules by the Compton scattering process. The EMP is generated by these
relativistic electrons by several mechanisms which depend on the altitude
H of the nuclear explosion above the Earth. A surface blast at low alti
tudes (H = 0-2 km) causes a hemispherical, rising Compton current
which creates a large net vertical dipole current. An air burst (H = 2-20
km) creates a small net vertical dipole moment because the asymmetrical
density of air which varies exponentially with height. A high-altitude
(H> 40 km) explosion creates Compton electrons that revolve in circles
around the Earth's magnetic field lines; the centripetal acceleration of the
Compton electrons produces EMP radiation. Because the Compton elec
trons are relativistic, the EMP radiation from the individual electrons
have a partial degree of coherence which can give very large E fields of
greater than 25 000 V1m. The high-altitude EMP pulse can illuminate
wide areas of the Earth's suface; the range ofthe EMP is determined by its
line-of-sight distance, D = (2RH)1/2, where R is the radius of the Earth.

= 1800kmandH = 250

B. Strength of the EMP fields
What is the approximate average (rms) E field generated
by the EMP pulse at a location D = 1000 km from the
blast? Assume thefollowing: (1) 1-Mt weapon contains 10 15
calor 4.2 X 10 15 J; (2) the prompt gamma rays constitute
0.3% of the total energy, they have an average energy of
about 1 MeV, and they are emitted over the lO-ns risetime
of the blast; and (3) about 0.6% of the gamma ray energy is
converted into Compton electrons. (If each of the fission
fragments emitted a I-MeV gamma ray, and if 50% of
these gamma rays were not absorbed by the materials ofthe
weapon, then about 0.5% (1 MeV/2ooMeV) of the energy
of the weapon would be in the form of prompt gamma
rays.)
Answer: The amount of energy available for the EMP
pulse from the I-Mt weapons is about
UEMP = (4.2X 10 15 J)(0.003)(0.006) = 7.6X 10 10 J.
This energy can be considered to be approximately evenly
distributed in a spherical shell with a volume 4rrD 2Twhere
D is the distance from the site to the blast. The thickness T
of the EMP shell is the product of the speed oflight and the
time duration of the blast, or T = (3 X lOs m/s)(lO- s s) = 3
m. Since 50% of the stored energy resides in the electric
fields, we obtain
UEMP/2

=

(EoE 2 /2)(4rrD 2 T)

or
E = (UEMP /4rrEoT)I/2/D
= (7.6X 1O IO X9X 109 /3)1/2/106 = 15000 V/m.

A more sophisticated calculation of the E field is carried

out in Sec. I C below, but this approximate estimate is suffi
cient to show that the E field can be quite large. The ener
gyI cm 2 deposited on the semiconducting components used
in C 3 is of the order of
(7.6X WID J)/(41T)(108 cm)2 = 6x 10- 7 J/cm 2.
This flux of energy can be effectively multiplied by the area
ofpowerlines, antennas, or missile bodies, and the resulting
electrical transients can be sufficient to destroy many of the
semiconducting devices.
C. Frequency spectrum
A fundamental calculation of the frequency and field
strength distributions from a high-altitude burst involves a
calculation of the magnitude of the Compton electronic
charge and how this charge accelerates in the Earth's mag
netic field. In order to do this we must consider the relativ
istic expression for the radiative power,
P = e2a2y4161TEr;e3,
from an accelerated charge where a is the acceleration and
y = 1/(1 - v21c2)1/2.
Using this relationship, what is the approximate magni
tude of the E field from a high-altitude, I-Mt explosion,
and what is the maximum frequency ofthe EMP spectrum?
The magnitude of the B field above the U.S. is about 0.6 G.
Answer: Because the duration of the explosion is about
10- 8 s, the maximum frequency possible for the EMP is
about 100 MHz, but in practice it is considerably lower.
Since the Compton electrons have a kinetic energy ofabout
I MeV = 2mr;e2; y = 3 and vic = 0.94. The radius of gyra
tion r of the Compton electrons in the Earth's field of0.6 G
is
r = ymov = 3(9.1 X 10- 31 kg)0.94(3 X 108 m/s)
eB
(1.6 X 10- 19 C)(O.6 X 10- 4 T)
=80m.
The frequency of radiation associated with this motion is
OJ

= vir = 0.94(3 X 108 m/s)/80 m = 3.5 Mrad/s,

or

1= OJ/21T =

r

= (4.2X 10 15 J)0.003 (
= 7.9X 10 15

which would not produce a very large E field. However,
since the wavelength of this radiation, A = ell = 540 m, is
much longer than the spatial thickness of the prompt radi
ation,

T = e( 10 ns) = 3 m,
and since the velocity of the Compton electrons is approxi
mately e, the EMP electric fields are partially additive, or
coherent. Let us initially assume that all N e electrons give
coherent EMP radiation; a comparison of the field from
this completely coherent situation can then be compared to
the given value of about 25 000 V1m to determine the de
gree of coherence.
If the Compton electrons radiated coherently, the effec
tive radiative power would be (N;)P = 1.0X 1026 (similar
to the radiative power of the sun!). The average value of the
Poynting vector for this radiation [neglecting the sin 2(O)
distribution] is P 141TD 2 where D is the distance from the
closest Compton electrons to the site (perhaps an average
effective value of 100 km). From this the average E field is
given by
E~(P 141TEoCD2)1/2
= [(1.0 X 1026 W)(9X 109)/(3 X 108 m/s)(10 10 m 2)p/2
= 5.5X 108 Vim.
Since this result is about 104 times larger than the reported
value of2.5 X 104 V1m, we see that, on average, only about
0.01 % of the Compton electrons must be totally coherent.
As the Compton electrons loses energy, lower-frequency,
longer-wavelength components are added to the EMP dis
tribution, and the radiation becomes less coherent.
Rather large currents can be generated by the EMP. The
voltage developed along the length of a 20-m missile could
be as much as V = (25 000 V1m) (20m) = 500 000 V. Since
the inductive impedance of a missile at I MHz is about
Z = 10 il, the current flowing along the surface of the mis
sile could be as high as as

I = VIZ = (5X lOS V)/(lOil) = 50 000 A.

0.56 MHz.

The approximate number of prompt gamma rays emit
ted from the I-Mt explosion is

N

added incoherently, the EMP radiated power would be
only about
(4.7X 1023 )(4.6 X 10- 22 W) = 220 W,

/i(

I MeV )1
I MeV)
1.6XIO-13JYI r

r IMt.

Since about 0.6% of this energy is converted to Compton
electrons, the approximate initial number of Compton
electrons produced is N e = 0.006(7.9 X 1025 ) = 4.7X 1023
electronsl Mt, or 75 000 C/Mt.
The initial centripetal acceleration for each Compton
electron is about
a = rOJ 2 = 80 m(3.5 X 106 /s)2 = 1.0X 10 15 m/s2.
The initial power radiated by this electron is
P = e2a2y4161TEoC3
= (1.6X 1O- 19 C)2(l.OX 10 15 m/s 2)(3)4(6X 109 )1(3 X 108 )3
= 4.6X 10- 22 W.
If the fields from the N e = 4.7 X 1023 Compton electrons

By coupling through various inductive and capacitive
transfer impedances, this current can produce voltage tran
sients on the center conductors of the cables in the missile
on the order of 1-100 V. While this amount of voltage will
only burn out the most sensitive semiconductors, it could
upset the digital circuitry and nullify its computer logic.
Much larger voltages could be developed on these logic
elements if one considers the voltages developed on the
powerlines to the missile sites, but is is possible to overcome
these difficulties by shielding and hardening the electronics
with filter circuits and fiber optics.
II. SPY SATELLITES
The high resolution6 obtainable with today's reconnais
sance satellites has both a stabilizing and a destabilizing
effect on the arms race. Since both sides are now capable of
counting and monitoring the intercontinental ballistic mis
siles (ICBM) of the other side, both sides should be less
prone to be driven by "worst case analysis" to build addi
tional systems to counter feared "missile gaps." Because of
the satellites and other national technical means, many felt

that the SALT treaties could be verified "adequately" to
ensure compliance by the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, one
could argue that accurate reconnaissance from spy satel
lites would allow a nation to consider a preemptive first
strike ifthe data showed that they might succeed in such an
act. On balance, the spy satellites may well be more stabiliz
ing then destabilizing to world peace; President Johnson
commented on this aspect in 1967 when he indicated that
the $35-$40 billion spent on space was worth it because "I
know how many missiles the enemy has." In this section we
will consider only the satellites using optical instruments,
but it should be pointed out that these satellites can also
monitor microwave, radiofrequency, active laser, and in
frared signals in order to obtain a unique composite pic
ture.
A. Size of objects
What is the smallest object that one might obtain with a
spy satellite under the following assumptions: (1) lens sys
tems with a focal lengths of 3-6 m; (2) satellite altitude of
150 km (100 miles); and (3) film with grain sizes of about 1
micron and a resolution ofabout 3 microns (1,u = 10- 6 mI.
(Ignore the limits to resolution by diffraction and by atmo
spheric seeing until Sec. II B.
Answer: Since the object distance is much greater than
the focal length (0 = 150 km> f = 3-6 m), the image dis
tance is approximately equal to the focal length: f = i. By
similar triangles we can relate the size ofthe smallest object
on the Earth, ho, to the image size on the film hi' by similar
triangles: holo = hili. Inserting the numerical assump
tions, the smallest object size on the earth is (ignoring the
broadening effects of Sec. II B)

las

ho = (o)(h i )If = (1.5 X
m)(3 ,u)/(3 m) = 15 cm (6 in.)
for the case of the 3-m lens and 7.5 cm (3 in.) for the case of
the 6-m lens.
B. Diffraction-limited resolution
What is the minimum diameter lens size necessary to
ensure that the "single slit" diffractive effects are about the
same as the film resolution caused by grain sizes of about 1
micron? Because of fluctuations in the atmosphere, astron
omers have found that it is very difficult to observe resolu
tions with optical telescopes much better than about one
second of arc. How does the angular resolution limitations
from diffraction compare to the resolution limitations
caused by atmospheric fluctuations?
Answer: The angular limitations caused by diffraction
can be approximated from the case of single slit diffraction
where the angle () of the first minima is obtained from the
formula (d 12) (sin ()) = A 12 where d is the diameter of the
slit and A is the wavelength of light. For the case of small
angles, we can equate the angle from diffraction to the an
gular size of the image; () = A Id = hill The image size
obtained from this approach, hi = fA. I d, is very close to the
more accurately obtained diffraction limit obtained for cir
cular lenses, hi = fA 10.82d. From this we obtain the ap
proximate minimum size of the satellite lens in order to
have equal broadening from diffraction and from grain
size,

d = A flO. 82 hi) = (0.5 ,u)(3 m)/(0.82X3,u) = 0.6 m.
The angular sizes of the diffraction limitation and the

image size are

() = A /(O.8d) = (5 X 10- 7 m)/(0.8 XO.6 m)
= 1.0X 10- 6 rad

= 0.2 arcsec.
Since this value is less than 1 arcsec from atmospheric see
ing, we might conclude that these resolutions are unattain
able. However, since the photos are taken considerably
above (100 km) the atmosphere, the effects of atmospheric
seeing should be reduced compared to the case of astron
omy since the fluctuating air cells are considerably closer (1
km) to the telescope. If the size of the lens is large, the
exposure time can be reduced and the effects of atmospher
ic seeing will be reduced. In addition, the resolution ofpho
tography from spy satellites can be improved by using the
following technical improvements: (1) folded optical sys
tems with longer focal lengths; (2) film containing photo
sensitive molecular dyes with considerably reduced grain
sizes; (3) lenses with larger diameters; (4) elliptical satellite
orbits with reduced perigees of perhaps 50 km (for a short
time) (5) computational techniques which deconvolute im
ages smeared by diffraction; and (6) computational analysis
of multiple exposures of the same object.
III. ICBM ACCURACY
If the accuracy of a missile is incree.sed, it follows that
the yield necessary to carry out a mission against a hard
ened military target can be correspondingly reduced. As
accuracy increased by a factor of 20 from about 5 miles in
1954 to 1/4 mile in 1970, the U.S. decreased the yield of its
warheads by a factor of about 100 from 9 Mt (Titan) to 50
100 kt (PolarislPoseidon) and 170-335 kt (Minuteman).
Thus increased accuracy was the necessary precursor to
the deployment ofsmaller warheads and MIRV. Accuracy
can be further improved by using NAVSTAR satellites
(Sec. IV), using the locations of stars, and other methods.
The newer technologies available to the cruise missile have
further increased accuracy to less than 10m for the cruise
missile. The tradeoff between accuracy and yield can be
qualitatively understood by considering the perfect gas
law. Since we expect the heat deposited within a sphere of
radius r to be proportional to the yield (Y) of the weapon,
the temperature rise (.:1 T) should be approximately propor
tional to the yield: Yex:: nC (.:1 T) where n is the number of
moles of air within the sphere and C is the specific heat of
air. If we are considering locations reasonably close to the
weapon, the temperature rise of the air will be approxi
mately the same as the absolute temperature: .:1T-:::=.T. In
serting these relationships into the perfect gas law, we ob
tain

PVex::Pr 3 ex::nRTex:: Y,
which gives the proportionality Pex:: Y Ir 3. This approxi
mate relationship agrees with the more accurate derivation
by Brode,7 who considered the conservation of energy,
mass, and momentum to obtain this result. (The r depen
dence of the overpressure is 1/r 3 rather than 1/r since the
width of a strongly compressed region increases propor
tionally to the distance r.) It also agrees with the high-pres
sure limit (the first term) in the empirical relationship7 de
rived from nuclear testing at the Earth's surface,
.:1P = 14.7YIr 3 + 12.8(YIr 3)1/2,
where.:1P is the overpressure in psi, Y is the yield in mega

tons, and r is the distance from the detonation in nautical
miles. Since accuracy improved by a factor of20 from 1954
to 1970, it follows that the yield could have been reduced by
a factor of (20f = 8000 in order to carry out the same mili
tary mission. Since the yield was reduced by only a factor of
100, the additional effective yield of Minuteman and Po
laris must have been dedicated to overcoming hardened
missile sites and to increasing the probability ofa successful
mission. The miniturization of nuclear weapons has also
enhanced the ability to destroy surface area ~as well as point
targets). Since the destruction area A a: y 2 3, the area will
be increased if the yield is divided (MIRV) among n sepa
rate warheads, Y, = n Y n • Since the ratio of the areas of
destruction is

AnIA,

= ny~/31Yi/3 = n(Y,/n)2/3IYi/3 = n'/3,

the area of destruction will be increased, for the case of

n = 10, by a factor of 101/3 = 2.15.

equation (.<1glg) is the bias error term; this is discussed in
Sec. VII.

B. Rotating flat Earth
If the vertical velocity is too large by an amount
.<1vz = (1O- 5 )(v) = 0.1 mis, the missile will fall to the west
of the target since the Earth has rotated an additional dis
tance eastward during the extra time of flight. How large is
this effect at the equator?
Answer: The error in the vertical velocity will increase
the time of flight by .<1t= 2(.<1v z )/g= (2)(0.1)/(9.8) = 0.02
s. Since the Earth moves 0.44 km/s at the equator, this
effect will cause the missile to fall to the west by about
.<1X = v.<1t = 0.44 km/s)(0.02 s) = 9 m. This value is about
a factor of 3 less than the published value of30 m/(O.1 m/s)
for elliptical orbits. Since the error is somewhat less than
the errors discussed above, we can ignore this contribution.

A. Guidance above the flat Earth
In order to avoid the mathematical complications8 from
an ICBM's Keplerian elliptical orbit, let us consider the
trajectory ofan ICBM that follows a parabolic path above a
large flat Earth. What is the accuracy of an ICBM which
has the following properties: (1) an initial velocity of
v = 104 m/s; (2) an uncertainty in the initial velocity of
.<1v = 1O- 5 v = 0.1 m/s in both the range and tracking di
rections; (3) an initial vertical angle of 0 = 30·~0.5 rad; (4)
a vetical alignment error of.<10 = (4 X 10- 5)(0) = 2 X 10- 5
rad; and (5) an azimuthal alingment error of .<1¢J = 10- 5
rad. For simplicity, we will shall consider these uncertain
ties to exist during the launch, rather than at the time when
the re-entry vehicle (RV) is separated from the bus of the
ICBM.
Answer: The range of the "flat Earth" ICBM is

X

= v2 sin(20 )/g = (1~)2(sin 60")19.8 = 8800 km.

The arrival time for this missile is

t

= 2v sin(300)/g = (2)(1~)(0.5)/(9.8) =

103 s~ 17 min,

fairly close to the 25-40 min that it takes an ICBM to travel
9000 km. By taking the differential of X and dividing by X,
we obtain

.<1XIX = 2(.<1vlv) + 2[.<10 Itan(20)] - (.<1glg).
The uncertainty in the range from the uncertainty in the
velocity is (2)(10- 5)(8800 km) = 176 m, and from the un
certainty in the vertical alignment is (2)(2 X 10- 5)(8800
km)/tan(600) = 203 m. In addition, we must take into ac
count the error in the tracking direction (the transverse
direction) caused by the misalignment of the azimulthal
angle,

.<1 Y = (.<1¢J )(v)(t) = (l0-5)(1~ m/s)(103 s) = 100 m.
Since the effects of these errors will add randomly, it is
appropriate to determine their root-mean-square value in
the range, or 0", = (176 2 + 203 2)'/2 = 269 m. Combining
this with the error in tracking we obtain 0" = (269 2
+ 1(02 )'1 2 = 287 m = 0.16 nm. If the range term was re
duced by a factor of 3, to 90 m, 0" would drop to 134
m = 0.07 nautical miles. For comparison sake, the new
MX missile is intended to have an accuracy of about 100m
(0.05 nautical miles) and the cruise missile has been shown
to have an accuracy of better than 5 m after traveling 300
miles (with continuous guidance). The last term in the

c. MX basing mode
One of the many issues raised in the discussion of the
MX missile is the type of basing mode9 that might be used
such as the "race track" shelters (vertical or horizontal),
"dense pack," hardened Minuteman silos, or submarine
based. Since it takes a relatively small overpressure of
about 5 psi to destroy an ordinary brick house and it takes a
significantly larger pressure of 2000 psi to destroy a hard
ened, H, Minuteman silo, it is clear that the choice of bas
ing mode is relevant to the survivability of the MX to a
first-strike attack. Determine the approximate accuracy
that would be necessary to destroy the MX shelter by an
attacking missile under these conditions: (1) the incoming
missile has a yield of 0.75 megatons; and (2) the MX is
stored either in a horizontal "race track" shelter which is
hardened to withstand about H = 600 psi, in a hardened
Minuteman silo (H = 2000 psi), or a superhardened silo
(H = 5000 psi or more).
Answer: The accuracy needed (r) to develop 600 psi from
a Y = 0.75 Mt bomb is obtained from

= 600 psi = (14.7)(0.75Ir 3) + (12.8)(0.75Ir 3)'/2,
which gives r = 0.28 nautical miles = 510 m. For the case
of H = 2000 psi we obtain r = 0.18 nautical miles = 335
m; and for H = 5000 psi we obtain r = 0.13 nautical
H

miles = 245 m. These results imply that there is a diminish
ing return for the hardening of missile sites since hardening
the silo from 2000 to 5000 psi only required improving the
accuracy from 0.18 to 0.13 nautical miles. The ultimate
hardening would be determined from the maximum radius
of the crater from the 0.75 Mt warhead which is about
r~ 160 y O. 3 = 140m for the case of the silo in a rock medi
um (170 m in dry soil). It is clear that the vulnerability of
the MX system, or any system, is much more complicated
(see Sec. VII) than this simple example as one must consid
er launch reliablity; the effect of the EMP on the C 3 sys
tems; the ability to determine the occupancy of an MX
shelter by thermal, acoustic, or optical sensors; the use of
decoys in shelters; fratricide effects (the destruction of an
incoming missile by another incoming missile); degrada
tion of theoretical performance standards; the inability to
test such a theoretical option; and the survivability of other
systems such as bombers, submarines, tactical weapons,
and cruise missiles.

D. Dense Pack

It has been proposed to base the MX missile in a very
closely packed matrix so that incoming missiles would des
troy each other (fratricide). Ifthe nearest-neighbor distance
is 545 m (1800 ft), determine the minimum value of the
hardness (H in psi) of the MX silos that would prevent the
incoming warheads (Y = 0.75, 1,5, and 25 Mt) from des
troying more than one MX silo. Consider the incoming
warheads to be accurately placed so that they land on the
surface, equidistance from two silos. (Accuracy of missiles
will be considered in Sec. VII.)
Answer: Since the nearest-neighbor spacing is 545 m, an
incoming warhead that was located halfway between two
silos would be 273 m from each silo. Using the formula for
overpressure from surface blasts (Sec. III q, we obtain the
following values: H> 3500 psi for 0.75 Mt warheads;
H> 5000 psi (1 mT); and H> 22 000 psi (5 Mt); and
H> 110 000 psi (25 Mt). In addition, one must consider the
size of the craters from these warheads; if the radius of the
craters.? is greater than 273 m, then both silos could be
destroyed. By using the Rand Corporation's "Bomb Dam
age Effect Computer" (1964), we have obtained the radii of
the craters in rock: r = 142 m (0.75 Mt), r = 158 m (1 Mt),
r = 279 m (5 Mt), and r = 485 (25 Mt). By using more resil
ient rock media it is possible to reduce these radii some
what, but it is clear that a very large warhead would create
a large enough crater to envelope two MX silos. (There is
some recent evidence that these crater radii should be re
duced by a factor of about 2.)

IV. NAVSTAR GLOBAL POSITIONING
SATELLITES
The United States is developing the NAVSTAR 10 sys
tem of orbiting satellites which would be used to enhance
the accuracy of cruise missiles, antiship missiles, glide
bombs, or heavy missiles. Twenty-four orbiting satellites
would be located in nongeosynchronous orbits about
11 000 miles above the Earth. The missiles would deter
mine their positions by comparing the time delays and
Doppler shifts of the signals from several satellites. Since a
cruise missile using the NAVSTAR guidance system
would not broadcast radar signals to determine its location,
but would only receive and analyze signals from satellites
to make midcourse guidance corrections, the NAVSTAR
system would diminish the vulnerability of the cruise mis
sile. The proponents of the system claim that NAVSTAR
would be viable for both high- and low-altitude approaches
and for "launch and leave" tactics that would allow the
launching aircraft to withdraw as soon as the missile is
fired; the opponents claim that the NAVSTAR signal
could bejammed and that the NAVSTAR satellites are soft
targets that could be destroyed easily.
A. Guidance by delay times
Using triangulation, estimate the approximate accuracy
in position available to a cruise missile system that had the
following characteristics: (1) NAVSTAR orbits are 17700
km above the Earth's surface and 24150 km above the
center of the Earth; (2) the 24 NAVSTAR satellites are in
equally spaced equatorial orbits; (3) the cruise missile fol
lows trajectories less than I km above the Earth's surface;
and (4) the cruise missile can measure time differences of
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Fig. 2. N AVSTAR global positioning satellites could increase the accura
cy of missiles in two ways. By monitoring the time differences of radio
signals from several NAVSTAR satellites, it would be possible to triangu
late the position of the missile to, perhaps, less than 10 m in three dimen
sions. By also monitoring the history of the Doppler shifts of the signals
from several NAVSTAR's, it should be possible to determine the velocity
ofthe missile to, perhaps,less than 1cm/s. As the missile moves ahead 1m
in its orbit, the side C increases by 0.35 m; this movement creates a time
delay of 2.4 ns between the signals from the NAVSTAR satellites closest
to the zenith satellite. This movement of 1 m makes the angle E = 5.6
X 10- 8 rad; this angle would cause a Doppler shift ofaboutO.1 Hz from a
lQO-GHz NAVSTAR signal.

about I ns between the signals from different NAVSTAR
satellitess.
Answer: For simplicity, let us consider the cruise missile
to be directly under one of the NAVSTAR satellites.The
signals from the first neighbor satellites (360°/24 = 15°) on
either side of the satellite in the zenith position) will arrive
at the cruise missile at the same time. (See Fig. 2.) First of
all, let us determine the distance C between the cruise mis
sile and the first neighbor NAVSTAR. Since we will be
using the differential form of the law of cosines, it will not
be necessary to carry out trigonometric calculations to nine
significant figures. Consider a triangle with side A as the
chord between the zenith satellite and its first neighbor,
side B as the distance between the zenith satellite and the
cruise missile (17 700 km), and side C. The chord length
A = 2R sin(7S) where R is 24150 km, the distance from
center of the Earth to a NAVSTAR satellite; we obtain
A = 6304 km. Since we know the length of sides A and B,
and the outside angle between these sides (105°), the dis
tance between the the first neighbor satellites and the cruise
missile is
C = [A 2 + B 2 + 2AB cos(1050W/ 2 = 17 184 km.
If the cruise missile moves forward in its orbit I m with
respect to its former position directly under the zenith
NAVSTAR, there will be a delay time between the pulses

from the two first-neighbor NAVSTAR's. Since the I-m
shfit will increase the distance B by only one part in 10 14,
we will consider both B and A as constants. The change in C
is thus mainly caused by the change in the angle between A
and B which is tan(E)~E = 0.001 km/17700 km = 5.6
X 10- 8 rad = 3.2X 10- 6 deg. The distances from the two
nearest-neighbor satellites to the cruise missile can be de
termined directly from the law of cosines by adding (and
subtracting) the angle E from the 105· angle; or, more easily,
by taking the differential of the law of cosines, (A and Bare
effectively constant)

Cf

-

C; =.::iC = ABE sin(105")1C = 0.35 m.

The time delay between the two nearest-neighbor NAV
STAR pulses will be (2XO.35 m)/(3X 108 m/s) = 2.4 ns
which is much larger than the inaccuracy from hydrogen
maser atomic clocks (10- 13 ) and quartz clocks which are
being considered for NAVSTAR. A more accurate treat
ment of this problem would have to take into account the
57oms transit time ofthe pulses and the relative velocities of
the two satellites. If the computer in the cruise missile is
able to take into account these factors, then, perhaps, the
NAVSTAR system might be able to determine locations
on their trajectories to within, perhaps, 10 m in three di
mensions.
B. Guidance by Doppler shifts
Estimate the change in the Doppler shift of a l00-GHz
signal from a NAVSTAR as an ICBM missile passes di
rectly under the NAVSTAR in the zenith position to 1 m
beyond the zenith position.
Answer: The velocities of the NAVSTAR and the ICBM
are determined from v = (GM Ir)l/2 where G = 6.673
X 10- 11 N m 2 /kg 2 ,Mis the mass ofthe Earth (5.983X 1024
kg), and the radius r is 24 150 km for NAVSTAR and 6450
km for the ICBM. We obtain v = 4066 m/s for the NAV
STAR and v = 7868 for the ICBM missile. Their relative
velocity is 3802 m/s (when they move in the same direction)
and 11 934 m/s (when they move in the opposite direction).
Since we can ignore the relativistic transverse Doppler shift
at these velocities, there will be no Doppler shift when the
ICBM is exactly in the zenith position. When the ICBM
moves forward by 1 m with respect to the zenith position,
the l00-GHz signal will be shifted by

.::if=f(vlc) sin(E) = (10 11 )(380213 X 108 )(5.6 X 10- 8 )

lites. The particle- and laser-beam weapons might be
mounted on the surface ofthe Earth, in the space shuttle, or
on satellite stations in space. These weapons have to be
described as futuristic since there are many technological
obstacles that must be overcome before they would become
operational. In addition, these weapons would be vulnera
ble to countermeasures by the attacking force. These weap
on systems have been described II in some detail by Tsipis et
aI., and we will discuss only their more general properties.
A. Energy deposition
What flux of energy (J/cm 2 ) would be necessary to preig
nite the chemical explosives around a nuclear weapon in
the incoming missile? Following Tsipis et al. assume that a
temperature rise of500 ·C can preignite the explosive mate
rial which has a density ofp = 0.8 glcm 3 and a molecular
weight of about M = 50. In addition, assume that the ab
sorption length for 1 GeV electrons is about 10 cm; the
beam loses about 10% of its energy in 1 cm. How much
would this flux of energy raise the temperature of the alu
minum body of the missile?
Answer: The energy density needed to predetonate the
chemical explosive is Q = Cp.::i TIM where the .::i T is the
temperature rise and the specific heat C = 3R = 25 J/mo
le·C (since T> 0D' the Debye temperature). We obtain

Q = (3R lo.::i TIM = (25)(0.8)(500)150 = 200 J/cm 3 •
Since about 10% of the energy is deposited in 1 cm, the
energy intensity of the beam must be about 2000 J/cm 2 in
order to deposit 200 J/cm 3 in the chemical explosive. This
same flux ofenergy would raise the temperature,.::i T, ofthe
aluminum missile:

Q = 200 J/cm 3 = (3R lo.::iT1M = (25)(2.7)(.::iT)/27,
which gives .::i T = 80·C. This modest temperature rise
would begin to cause some internal stresses and misalign
ment in the missile. Doses about eight times larger (16 000
J/cm 2 and 1500 J/cm 3 ) would raise aluminum to its melt
ing temperature of 660 ·C. In addition, the particles can
cause havoc with the semiconducting components in the
guidance systems; energy densities as low as 25 J/cm 3 can
cause shifts in the switching thresholds of the circuit ele
ments and 1000 J/cm3 can destroy the elements. The ener
getic particles could create centers for trapping, and re
combination which would reduce the lifetime of the
minority carriers.

=0.071 Hz
when they travel in some direction and.::if = 0.22 Hz when
they travel in the opposite direction. In addition it can be
readily shown that a 1-m movement in the position of the
ICBM will also shift the signal from the neighboring NAV
STAR satellites by about 0.1 Hz. Presumably, by measur
ing the various beat frequencies available to the ICBM, it
should be possible to determine positions on the trajectory
from the history of the Doppler shift measurements to less
than tens of meters. (Or the velocity to, perhaps, 1-10 cm/s
using the position data from time delays in Sec. IV A.)
V. PARTICLE AND LASER BEAM WEAPONS
The superpowers are currently developing weapons that
would utilize the kinetic energy (in the GeV range) of parti
de beams or the energy content of laser beams to destroy
incoming missiles, surface cruise missiles, ships, or satel

B. Beam current and angular resolution
What minimum beam current of 1 GEV electrons would
be necessary to preignite the chemical explosive in the in
coming missile? Assume that the size of the beam is dictat
ed by the 1-m diameter of the missile booster and that the
pulse duration is determined by the velocity of the missile,
v = 104 m/s. What angular accuracy (.::iO) would be re
quired to disable a missile which is 1000 km away and
above the atmosphere?
Answer: Using the energy intensity of 2000 Jlcm 2 from
Sec. V A, the energy delivered to an area of 1 m 2 (dictated
by the diameter of the missile) is (2000 J/cm 2 ) (104
cm 2 ) = 2x 107 J. In order to keep the area of the beam on
the missile for a single shot without continuous tracking,
the time duration of the pulse must be less than t = (1 ml
104 m/s) = 0:' ms. The energy in the pulse is VIt = 2 X 107
J where V = 109 V and I is the current in amperes. Solving

for I, we get

1= (2X 107 )1Vt = (2X 107 )1(109 )(10- 4 ) = 200 A.
If the beam was intended to melt aluminum or destroy se
miconducting components, the current and energy of the
beam must be at least five times higher, or 1000 A and 108 J.
It has been estimated that the efficiency of prOducing a
pulse of particles is about 1/6, thus it takes about 6 X 108 J
to make the 1000-A pulse. Since it takes abot 0.91b of coal
to generate a kW h = 3.6 X 106 J, it would take about 150 Ib
of coal (or 1000 Ib of TNT) to generate one pulse; the large
amount of any type of fuel would certainly complicate the
logistics of placing either particle- or laser-beam weapons
on a space station. For comparison sake there are already
existing high-voltage, low-current accelerators, such as the
Fermilab's proton accelerator which has a current of 0.1
rnA at an energy of 500 GeV, and there are low-voltage,
high-current electron accelerator used in the fusion pro
gram which have a current of 106 A (per beam) at an energy
of 2 MeV. Because the Earth's magnetic field will deflect
long-range, charged particle beams, a beam of neutral hy
drogen atoms (produced from H - beams passing through a
stripper gas) might be considered. The present technology
is not yet capable of these requirements as the Los Alamos
Meson Factory is capable of developing currents of only
0.15 A ofH- ions at 1 GeV.
In order to "shoot a bullet 1000 km away with a bullet,"
the beam must be aligned to within an accuracy of Ji() = 1
m/106 m = 10- 6 rad. Since this kind ofaccuracy would be
difficult to carry out, it is likely that the beam current
would have to be correspondingly increased to compensate
for a larger spread in beam size at the target. If Ji ()'.:::::!.10 - 5,
the current and total energy of the beam would have to be
increased by a factor of 100; if the target was considerably
closer, this would not be necessary.
C. Burning a hole in the atmosphere
Since relativistic electrons and protons of about 1 GeV
lose about 0.2 GeVIkm when they pass through air, they
would not be able to penetrate through the entire atmo
sphere. Particle beam weapons that were located on the
surface ofthe Earth would have to be able to "burn a hole in
the atmosphere" in order to reduce energy losses and make
the weapon viable over longer distances. If the air density
in the "hole" in the atmosphere was reduced by a factor of
10, then the energy loss rate would be reduced to 0.02
GeVIkm, and the beam would then lose about 0.2 GeV
(20% of the beam energy) to pass through the entire atmo
sphere of 10 km. Approximately how much energy would
it take to reduce the density of the air by a factor of ten in a
"hole" that had an area of 1 cm 2 and was 1 km long? The
density of air is 1.3 kglm3 and its specific heat at constant
pressure is 1000 JIkg ·C.
Answer: Using the perfect gas law, PV = nRT, we see
that the temperature must be raised from about 300 to 3000
K in order to allow a reduction in the density, nlV, by a
factor of 10. The mass of the heated air in the atmospheric
hole is (1.3 kglm 3 )( 103 m)( 10- 4 m 2) = 0.13 kg. The amount
of energy required to heat the "hole" is
Q = mCJi T = (0.13)( 1000)(2700) = 3.5 X 105 J.
Additional energy would be lost by the partial heating of
the air forced out ofthe hole, by the loss of scattered radi
ation and secondary particles, and by turbulance. Our val
ue of 0.4 X 106 JIktn is a lower bound value and it is about

25% of the more accurately calculated II value of 1.5 X 10°
Jlkm. This energy loss is about 1%/km of the beams ener
gy of 108 J; a lO-km path would use 10% of the beam's
energy; this is similar to the energy that would be lost by the
beam as it passed through the hole. At this time it is unclear
how long the high-energy beam would remain in the hole
over these extended distances.
D. Laser-beam weapons
Either a 25-kJ pulse laser or a 1-MW continuous laser is
capable of destroying nearby aircraft. However, since laser
beams do not readily pass through fog or rain, the laser
beam weapons could not be counted on to defend against a
surprise attack on a rainy day. For this reason, the laser
beam weapons (if they are ever deployed) would probably
be used above the atmosphere. Determine the necessary
energy for a laser pulse to destroy a missile 1000 km away
using these assumptions: (1) it takes a pulse ofabout 1000 J I
cm 2 (Sec. V A above) to create an impulsive failure in thin
metal targets such as missiles; (2) the CO 2 laser has a wave
length A = 10.6 Jlm; and (3) the beam extraction mirror of
the laser has a diameter d = 3 m.
Answer: The finite diameter of the extraction mirror
causes a diffraction broadening in the laser beam
Ji() = 1.2U Id = (1.22)(1O.6X 10- 6 m/3 m)
= 4.3 X 10- 6 rad.

This effect will broaden the radius of the laser beam 1000
km away to
r = (Ji() )(1000 km) = 4.3 m.

Since it takes about 1000 J/cm 2 ofabsorbed energy to par
tially melt and crack the missile body, the energy in the
laser pulse must be (1000 J/cm 2 )(1T)(430 cm)2 = 5.8 X 108 J
for the case of total absorption, and ten times this for the
case of 10% absorption of the laser beam. This energy re
quirement is considerably larger than the presently con
templated 25-kJ pulsed lasers being developed for the fu
sion program. If the weapon was a 1-MW continuous laser,
then the laser would have to be focused on the target for

t = (5.8 X 108 J)/(106 J/s) = 580 s~ 10 min,
which is one of the reasons that very large HF lasers are
now being explored.
VI. THE NEUTRON BOMB
Because the yield of a neutron bomb l2 is approximately
equally divided between the fission and fusion processes, it
produces many more neutrons (that are also much more
energetic than the neutrons from a pure fission tactical
weapon). It is for this reason that the neutron bomb is also
referred to as the enhanced-radiation weapon (ERW). The
deployment ofthe neutron bomb in Europe has been a con
troversial issue for several reasons: On the one hand, it has
been encouraged because some feel that we will not use our
present tactical weapons to stop an invasion of convention
ally armed tanks because the yield of our present tactical
weapons is too large (some are greater than 20 kt, but some
also that can be reduced with a dial to about 1 kt). These
leaders want the neutron bomb because a 1-kt version
would be able to incapacitate tank crews at a distance of
about 850 m compared to 375 m for a pure fission weapon
of the same yield. They argue that it would destroy about
five times as many tanks for about the same amount ofblast

damage to the countryside ofan ally. The proponents ofthe
neutron bomb feel that the mere possession of it would
increase the perception of the potential invader. that. we
would actually use it, and thus it would deter an invasIO~.
On the other hand, it can be envisioned that the use of!hls
type of a tactical weapon would lowe~ !he psychological
and bureaucratic threshold for the deciSion makers to use
nuclear weapons, and thus its deployment would increase
the probability that there would be a precursor to a more
general nuclear war that nobody wants. The opponents of
the neutron bomb do not believe that the neutron bomb
would actually incapacitate that many tank crews because
the invading forces would space the tanks further apart in
order to negate the effects of the neutron bomb.
A. Number of neutrons
Determine the approximate numbers of neutrons at a
distance of 800 m from weapons that derive their energy
from (1) pure fission, (2) pure fusion, and (3) 50% each of
fission and fusion. Assume the following: (1) the weapons
have a yield of I kt = 10 12 cal = 4.2 X 10 12 J; (2) initially,
ignore the scattering of the fast neutrons by the atmo
sphere; (3) the energy of fission is about 200 MeV and the
energy from fusion (H 2 + H 3-+He4 + nj is 17.6 MeV; and
(4) the chain reaction from a fission weapon yields about
one surplus neutron.
Answer: The yield ofa l-kt weapon is (4.2X 1012 J) (leV/
1.6X 10- 19 J) = 2.6X lQ31 eV. If one assumes that one of
the three neutrons from a fission event is used to sustain the
chain reaction and one is absorbed in the weapon, then one
neutron/fission will escape from the weapon. The number
of neutrons that escape from a l-kt fission weapon is about

n = (2.6X 1031 eV)(1 neutron/2X 108 eV)
= 1.3 X lQ23 neutrons.

the number of neutrons from a l-kt pure fusion weapon
would be about

n = (2.6X 1031 eV)(1 neutron/17.6X 106 eV)
= 1.5 X IQ2 4 neutrons,

which is about a factor of 10 greater than the result for the
fission weapon. Since a fusion weapon needs the heat from
the fission precursor, it is necessary to have a mixed fis
sion/fusion weapon to make a neutron bomb. For the case
of50%/50%, we obtain 8.2 X 1023 neutrons which is about
six times the number ofneutrons from a comparable fission
weapon. [The number of neutrons per kiloton can also be
increased by removing the "tamper" (orjacket) material on
the outside ofthe weapon.]
Neglecting the scattering of the fast neutrons by the at
mosphere, we obtain the integrated neutron flux at 800 m
as follows:
n/area

=

1.3 X lQ23/(41r)(8 X lQ4 cm)2
= 1.6X 10 12 neutrons/cm 2

for the case of the fission weapon and 1013 neutrons/cm 2
for the neutron bomb. Because ofscattering and absorption
by the atmosphere and other uncertainties, these values for
the neutron fluxes are about two to three times greater than
the experimental 13 values. (The fluxes actually drop more
quickly, closer to r- 4 than r- 2 • Brode7 indicates that the
exponential function e - rip can be used.)

B. Radiation dosages
If a person receives a dose of about. 8000 r~d~ (1
rad = 100 erg/g), he or she will be incapacitated Within a
period of about 5 min and will die within a day or two. If a
l-kt fission bomb will deliver about 250 rads of neutrons at
a distance of 800 m, what approximate dosage level ~ould
the neutron bomb deliver at the same distance? What IS the
approximate ratio of radioactive fallout from the neutron
bomb and the fission bomb?
Answer: The radiation dosage from the neutron bomb
would be considerably greater than a fission bomb of the
same yield because it produces about ~ix times more nel;l
trons and each neutron is bout seven Umes more energetic
(14 MeV/2 MeV = 7). Thus one would expect the neutron
bomb to deliver an instantaneous dosage ofabout (250 rads)
(6) (7)~ 10 000 rads, which is enough to incapacitate a per
son within about 5 min. Since the fission process produces
much more radioactivity than the fusion process, the neu
tron bomb (which is 50% fission) will produce about 50%
as much radioactive fallout as the pure fission bomb.

c. Reduced blast
About 50% of the yield of a fission weapon appears in
the form of blast energy which can destroy buildings. For
the case of a fusion bomb, the blast contribution is only
20%. How much less area would be destroyed by a blast
from a neutron weapon than from a fission weapon?
Answer: The blast energy (BE) for the fission weapon is
0.5 kt and for the neutron bomb it is about (0.5 + 0.2)/
2 = 0.35 kt. Since the destruction area is approximately
proportional to (BE)2/3 (see Sec. III), the ratio of destruc
tion area from the neutron bomb to that ofthe fission bomb
is An/Af = (0.35/0.5)2/3 = 0.79. This result indicates that
the destruction area from the use of the neutron bomb
would be about 21 % less than the destruction area of a
fission bomb of the same yield. Combining this result with
the increased area for neutron dosages, one obtains a neu
tron radiation area from the neutron bomb which is about
(800 m/375 m)2/(0.79) or six times greater for the same
blast area from the fission bomb.
VII. WAR GAMES
In this section we shall briefly discuss some simplified
models for "war games" that have been discussed in the
literature. These models have allowed the participants in
the debates on the arms race to compare widely diverse
missile systems in order to prove their debating points. Per
haps ultimately, one can not use equations and parameters
to describe the "action-reaction" escalation of the arms
race, and the degree ofstability from mutually assured de
struction (MAD), but it is also true that these mathematical
models do give some meaningful insights into the interac
tions that affect the outcomes of these difficult questions.
The results of the this section should be properly modified
to account for the many uncertainties in the arms race: (1)
the debris (EMP, wind, ionized atmosphere, dust particles)
from an incoming missile can negate a second incoming
missile (the fratricide effect), or prevent the launching of
the missile in the silo from being launched (the pin-down
effect); (2) the uncertainty in the parameters of the missile
systems will complicate any numerical analysis; this is par
ticularly true for the reliability of these complex systems;
(3) since the Partial Test Ban treaty (PTB) prevents any

rehearsal of a preemptive first strike, no attacker can be
sure that the intricate timing and coordination of events
will actually be successful; (4) the uncertain locations of
submarines missile systems, bombers, cruise missiles mo
bile missiles, and tactical weapons will further compiicate
a~y dis~ussion of a "first strike in a war game"; and (5)
either side may have strategies and hardware that are un
known to the other side.

A. Lethality parameter
During the testimony on the SALT II treaty before the
U.S. Senate, the lethality parameter K was used to discuss
the various U.S. and U.S.S.R. missile systems. It was de
fin~d as K = Y 2/3 ICEp 2 , where Y is the yield of the weap
on m megatons and CEP is the accuracy (the circular error
probable) of the weapon in nautical miles. The CEP is de
fined as the radius of the circle centered in the pattern
which contains 50% of the missiles which were launched.
The center of this pattern can be shifted from the aim point
by bias errors (which may, or may not, be included in the
definition of CEP). Why would the testimony on SALT II
use the K parameter? In our calculations we will assume
that the testimony was ony dealing with the silo-busting,
high-pressure regime ofsmall distances from the silo where
one considers only the first term in the pressure relation
ship (Sec. III). Let us speculate on the general form (follow
ing Tsipis's derivation 14) of the single-shot-kill-probability
(SSKP) formula if one considers that the accuracy of the
individual missiles are randomly spread about the aim
point with a normal Gaussian distribution such that the
probability of survival is
P = es

r;/2">

where the survival radius rs is the minimum distance from
the silo that a weapon of yield Y can explode without de
stroying the silo. The standard deviation ofthe distribution
is q and assume that it is proportional to CEP; Tsipis has
shown that q = 0.85 CEP. Assume that the silo is hardened
to withstand a pressure of H psi before it is destroyed.
Answer: The minimum pressure to destroy a missile silo
is H = J.P a:. Y 1r 3. The area in which the silo could be de
stroyedisproportionaltor 1a:. (Y IH)2/3. The area that con
tains 50% of the missile landings is proportional to CEp2.
The ratio of the area of destruction to the area of accuracy
is proportional to y 2 / 3 /CEp 2 which is defined as the letha
lity K. This definition contains only the parameters of the
incoming missile without mentioning the degree ofharden
ing of the silo. By multiplying K by the MIRV number n
and the number of missiles of that category, m, one can
obtain the lethality of a class ofmissiles, nmK. By summing
over all the classes of missiles, one obtains the grand total
lethality ofa nation's arsenal. This procedure has been used
in the testimony before the Congress and elsewhere. 14 The
discussion on lethality can be misleading in that a warhead
can have a very large lethality, but it still can destroy at
most only one silo.
It follows that the single-shot kill probability for a mis
sile is of the form
Pk-- 1 - Ps-- 1 -e - r;/2"> -- 1 -e - y213/BH2I CEp2 ,

B. Minuteman vulnerability
The uncertainties that we described in the introduction
to this section indicate that a simple calculation of the vul
nerability of the Minuteman force is more complicated
than the formulas that we have developed in Sec. VII A. In
addition, the retaliatory aspects of the submarines,
bombers, and tactical weapons can act as a deterrent if one
were ~o wish to take advantage of whatever vulnerability
the Mmuteman force has. Determine the SSKP of destroy
ing a Minuteman silo assuming the following param
eters9 •14 : (1) Minuteman silos are hardened to about
H = 2000 psi; (2) the Russian SS-18 warheads have a yield
Y = 0.75 megatons and a CEP = 0.15 nautical miles (at
some point in the future); and (3) the reliability R of an SS
18 is, perhaps, 0.8, or 0.9. What is the kill probability for a
silo if two SS-18 weapons from different launchers are
aimed at the Minuteman silo?
Answer: The lethality of the SS-18 warhead is
K = (0.75)2/3/0.15 2 = 36.7. The SSKP for the SS-18 on a
Minuteman silo is
Pk = 1 - e - 36.7/10.22)(2000)2/3 = 1 - 0.35 = 0.65.
The SSKP should be multiplied by the reliability of the SS
18 to obtain the success rate for each SS-18 warhead' we
obtain 52% for 80% reliability, and 59% for 90% reli~bil
ity. For the case of two SS-18 weapons from different
launchers (arriving less than about 10 s apart to avoid fra
tricide effects), the kill probability is Pk 2 = 1-(0.48)2
= 77% for 80% reliability and 83% for 90% reliability.
Because offratricide effects, it is likely that at most two SS
18's would be targeted at one Minuteman silo, one in the air
and one on the ground. Nevertheless, for the case of three
independent SS-18's, P k3 = 1 - (0.48f = 89% (for the
case of 80% reliability). Since there are 1000 Minuteman
missiles, these results imply that perhaps 170 to 230 would
survive two SS-18's, and 100 would survive three SS-18's.
The latter case would consume the entire SS-18 force since
there are about 308 SS-18 launchers and each is MIRVed
ten times. Since neither side has projected missiles over the
North Pole, this discussion may not consider the additional
bias error l5 (J.gIg term, Sec. III A) from the intended tar
get caused by uncertainties in the Earth's gravitational
field. Since the polar radius of the Earth is 21 km (0.3%)
smaller than its equatorial radius, the quadrupolar correc
tion to g should be of the order of (J.gIg) ~ 10- 3, or 100
times larger than the ratio of (CEPIrange) = (10 - 1 km/104
km) = 10- 5 • It follows that the corrections for the multipo
larity and the local gravity at the launch site must be car
ried out to within about 1% accuracy in order to prevent
degradation of the CEP accuracy of the missile.
As we have shown, the probability of destroying a mis
sile site depends on many parameters (Y, CEP, H, R, and
gravitational bias error). It is possible to determine the rela
tive importance of changes in these parameters by taking
the differential of the total single-shot kill probability TK
which takes into account the reliability R of the missile
system:

TK=RPk =R(1-e- U

),

J

where Tsipis has shown that B = 0.22 when Y is in mega
tons, H is in psi, and CEP is in nautical miles. Using the
definition of lethality, this formula becomes
Pk = 1 _ e-K/O.22H2IJ.

where a = K I(O.22H 2/3) = Y 2/3/0.22CEp 2H 2/3. It fol
lows that

J.TK ITK = J.R /R

+ (2a/3)(J.Y IY -J.H IH

- 3J. CEPICEP)/(ea - 1).

For the case of an SS-18 attacking Minuteman, we have
used Y = 0.75 Mt, H = 2000 psi, CEP = 0.15 (in 1985?),
R = 0.8 to 0.9, K = 36.7, and a = 1.0506. If we allow the
parameters (Y, H, CEP, and R) to vary by 10%, we find
that a 10% increase in yield (.1 Y I Y = 0.1) will increase TK
by 3.8% (.1 TKITK = 0.038). Similarity, TK can be in
creased by 10% by increasing reliability by 10%; TK can
be increased by 11.3% by decreasing CEP by 10%; and TK
can be decreased by 3.8% by increasing hardness by 10%.
From this it is clear, that reliability and CEP are the most
sensitive variables.

(V) into the second equation; we obtain
oX - (a

+ b)X + (ab -

kl)x = hk - bg.

Depending on the magnitude (and sign) of the parameters,
the result can be analogous to the differential equation for a
damped spring and mass system in a gravitational field.
Since both a and b < 0, the term will damp but the oscilla
tory solutions. If ab > kl, the arms race will have stable
oscillations, and if ab < kl, the arms race will be uristable.
In Richardson's analysis of these equations, he added the
coordinates x and y in order to utilize normal coordinate
solutions.

x

C. Richardson model
The literature contains a variety of mathematical mod
els 16 that attempt to describe various aspects of the arms
race. A physicst, Lewis Richardson, was one of the first
(1919) to attempt a significant mode1 17 of the arms race
based on the statistics of past wars. His model considered
the action-reaction response of one nation to the threat of
increased military spending by its adversary.The two-na
tion model uses the coupled differential equations

.x =
Y=

ky + ax

+ g,

lx+by+h,
where x and yare the armament levels of the tWb natkms,
and a, b, k, I, g, and h are parameters. What is the signifi
cance of the various terms in these equations? What signs
would you expect for the various parameters? Derive a suf
ficient condition for the parameters which would ensure a
stable condition between the two adversaries.
Answer: The first terms on the right in the equations are
the "threat," or "reaction" terms and they represent the
pressure on one nation to increase its armaments when its
neighbor has armaments that can threaten its existence.
Since the "defense coefficients" are positive (k and I > 0),
the arms race would be exponentially unstable if we consi
dered only the first terms in the equations.
The second terms are the "economic burden" terms; the
finiteness of labor, capital, and resources of a nation will
reduce the predicted production rate of armaments. Since
these "fatigue" or "expense" coefficients are negative (a
and b < 0), it is possible to have some stability in the arms
race.
The third terms are the constant "grievance," or "ambi
tion" terms; the coefficients g and h are positive when the
nations are dissatisfied and negative when they are satis
fied.
The condition for stability is determined by solving the
first equation for y and then substitutingy and its derivative
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